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_/ 
The rise of scientific philosophy 
It was in 1922 that Moritz Schlick- a German physicist-cum-
philosopher of aristocratic manners and conservative opinions 
- arrived in Vienna. He had been invited to take up the chair 
of philosophy 'with special reference to the history and theory 
of the inductive sciences' that had been created for another 
physicist-cum-philosopher, Ernst Mach, in 1895. Mach himself 
had previously served for almost thirty years as professor of 
experimental physics in Prague, and it will be important in 
what follows to remember that Prague was still to some extent a 
German city and a centre ofintellectual activity almost no less 
important than Vienna herself. The lines of communication 
between the two former Imperial-Royal capital cities2 were still 
strong, and the same figures were often, at different times, 
prominent in each. 
The two cities shared also the characteristically . Austrian 
predilection - nurtured, certainly, by the culture of the coffee 
house - for forming clubs, societies, and discussion groups.3 
Austrian cultural life was indeed to a striking extent a matter of 
'schools', 'movements' and 'circles of contemporaries', and one 
might pause to reflect on the degree to which such schools and 
movements have determined the artistic, intellectual and 
political world we inhabit today. Thus consider, in no 
particular order, the Vienna psychoanalytic movement, the 
Zionist movement founded by Theodor . Herzl, the 'new 
Viennese school' of composition around· Arnold Schonberg, 
the school of linguists and psychologists around Karl Buhler, 
the school of Austrian economics founded by Carl Menger in 
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1871 and evolving, by degrees, into the circle around Ludwig 
von Mises and the young Friedrich von Hayek in the 1920s. Or 
consider the 'Prager Kreis' of novelists and critics around Max 
Brod, Felix Weltsch and Franz Kafka; or the Prague linguistic. 
circle of Roman Jakobson, Jan Mukafovsky and Nikolai 
Trubetskoy; or the so-called Louvre circle, a discussion group 
of adherents of Brentanian philosophy meeting fortnightly in 
the Cafe Louvre in Prague, to which the young Franz Kafka 
also belonged.4 · 
Schlick, too, had his regular Thursday evening discussion 
circle. This comprised above all a group of mathematicians 
around Hans Hahn, himself a former student of Mach, and 
including Kurt Godel, Gustav Bergmann, Karl Menger (son of 
the economist Carl) and Schlick's own assistant Friedrich' 
Waismann. The Schlick circle included also Philipp Frank, 
another former student of Mach based principally in Prague 
(where he had succeeded Einstein in the chair of physics); and 
it included also Herbert Feigl, Viktor Kraft, Rudolf Carnap, 
and a sociologist-cum~philosopher, proletarian in manner and 
socialist in his opinions, 5 by the name of Otto N eurath. 
Carnap is, apart from Schlick himself, the single native 
German on this list, and it is indeed remarkable to consider the 7 
extent to which not merely logical positivism but also the exact 
or scientific philosophy of which it formed a part was and is a 
characteristically Austrian phenomenon. One thinks in this 
connection not only of Mach, but also of another Prague figure 
of an earlier generation, Bernard Bolzano. Bolzano was on the 
one hand a priest and social reformer, author of one of the last 
social utopias (Vom besten Staate); but he was also a notable 
mathematical logician and philosopher of science, though his 
contributions in these fields were unfo1 tunate!y largely 
ignored until after his death.. One thinks of Ludwig 
Boltzmann, hero of Wittgenstein and contemporary of Mach· 
in Vienna; and indeed one thinks of Wittgenstein himself, of 
Ludwik Fleck, Karl Popper, Michael Polanyi, Paul 
Feyerabend, Wolfgang Stegmiiller and Imre Lakatos - all of 
them Austrians (orAustro-Hungarians) who have, for better 
of worse, done much to determine the shape of the philosophy 
of science as we know it today.6 
Here it is perhaps Ludwik Fleck who deserves most mention. 
Fleck was born in 1896 in Lemberg (Lw6w), capital of Galicia 
on the eastern fringes of the Empire. He was the author of 
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some 200 scientific papers in the areas of medicine and 
microbiology.7 But he was also the author of a longer, 
philosophical work, published in 1935, entitled Genesis and 
Development of a Scientific Fact. Introduction to the Doctrine of 
Cognitive Style and of the Thought-Collective. This work is of 
interest first of all because, as a contribution to the nascent 
discipline of 'sociology of science', it anticipates and perhaps 
even served to inspire some of the !}OW so influential ideas of 
Thomas Kuhn (who in fact contributed a preface to the 
English translation of the work). But it is of interest also, as we 
shall see below, because Fleck was one of a number of 
Lemberg-based philosophers and philosophically-minded 
scientists and mathematicians who were to become associated, 
in different ways, with the developments in scientific 
philosophy that were taking place to the west - and Lemberg 
will, like Prague, have a quite special role to play in the story 
that follows. 
, The native German philosophers who have made serious 
contributions to exact philosophy or to the philosophy of 
science in the modern sense are, in contrast, remarkably few, 
and of these - .one thinks particularly of Hans Reichenbach 
and Carl Hempel - it can often be asserted that the .true 
flowering oftheir thought and influence has occurred through 
formal or informal collaboration with their Austrian teachers 
or contemporaries.8 Of quite specific interest for our own 
purposes is the fact that so many of these philosophers, as also 
of the sympathetic philosophically-minded German scientists 
- one thinks in particular of Kurt Grelling and of the Gestalt 
psychologists Wolfgang Kohler and Kurt Lewin - were based 
in Berlin, where the 'Society for Empirical Philosophy' was · 
established in 1928 as a counterpart to the Schlick circle in 
Vienna .. 
Philosophy and politics 
Ayer himself arrived in Vienna in late November of 1932, 
spending a protracted honeymoon of just over three months in 
Austria before returning to Oxford to write Language, Truth 
and Logi,c. The Schlick circle was at this time at the very height 
of its activity. It had already organised its first two international 
conferences, and at the first of these, held in Prague in 1929, 
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had distributed copies of its manifesto, the 'Wissenschaftliche 
Weltauffassung' or 'Scientific Conception of the World'. This 
was written, effectively, by Neurath, with Carnap and Hahn 
(and to a lesser extent other members of the circle) serving 
merely to temper some of Neurath's wilder flights of fancy. 
The patrician Schlick, to whom the manifesto was dedicated, 
was less than satisfied with the· result. This Was first of all 
because he was not taken by the conception of the circle as a 
'movement' of any sort, favouring a more modest and more 
narrowly scientific approach: 
Schlick hated everything that smacked of agitation, was 
against it all: 'It is not necessary for us to agitate: that we can 
leave to the political parties: in science we say what we have 
found, we hope to say the truth; and if it is the truth, then it 
will win out.' (Haller and Rutte, p.31) 
But it was also because he was distressed by the political tone of 
the piece, and more specifically by those portions which 
suggested some sort of alignment of logical positivism with 
socialism and with the movement for workers' education in 
Vienna at the time. 
The circle had already, by 1932, taken over - with the 
group around Reichenbach in Berlin - the journal Annalen der 
Philosophie, renaming it Erkenntnis. And it had published some 
six volumes of its series of Schriften zur wissenschaftlichen 
Weltauffassung, including works by Richard voh. Mises (brother 
of the economist Ludwig), and by Carnap, Schlick, Neurath 
and Philipp Frank, together with a peculiar work, entitled On 
the Biology of Ethics: Psychopathological Investigations of Guilt-
Feelings and the Formation of Moral Ideals: A Contribution on the 
Essence of the Neurotic Human Being, by a certain Otto Kant.9 
Ayer himself, who attended the weekly discussion meetings 
of the circle and a .course of university lectures given by Schlick 
on the philosophy of science, seems not to have been troubled 
by the puzzle as to why it should have been Austria, specifically, 
that witnessed such a. peculiar flowering of scientific 
philosophy. His autobiography does . however contain one 
remark on what Ayer saw as the political role of the group 
around Schlick: 
The members of the Vienna Circle, with the notable 
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exception of Otto Neurath, were not greatly interested in 
politics, but theirs was also a political movement. The war of 
ideas which they were waging against the Catholic church 
. had its part in the perennial Viennese conflict betwe<Jl the 
socialists and the clerical reaction. (1977, p.129) 
A thesis along these lines has indeed been argued quite 
seriously by the Viertnese historian Friedrich· Stadler, who 
provides us with a great mass of documentation to support his 
case. Stadler suggests that we see the University of Vienna in 
the interwar period as split jnto 'two camps': 
on the one side, in the realm of scientific philosophy, there 
dominated democratic (enlightenment, liberal, socialist) 
tendeiicie§; OI). the other side there was a spectrum of almost 
all forms of anti-democratic feeling, from neo-romantic 
conservatism to fascist-totalitarian outgrowths. Thus it is 
tempting to see the philosophical life as part of the fierce 
party-political Kulturkampf of the time, between· the 
bourgeois camp and the workers' movement. (1979, p.42) 
The idea that the flowering of scientific phit~ophy in 
Austria can be accountedfor by regarding the Schlic circle as 
a manifestation .of Austrian socialism, or of anti-de ·calism, 
seems however to be at best the product of a certain sort of 
over-tidy wishful thinking. Why, one might ask, did socialist 
anti"clericalism not lead to similar phenomena in France, or 
Spain, or Italy? And how is .such a thesis to cope with the fact 
that so few important Austrian philosophers of science, and so 
few of the members of the Vienna circle - N eurath, Hahn and · 
Carnap constituting here the principal exceptions ,...... were of 
socialist persuasion?10 
Neurath was, it must be admitted, the most vocal and the 
most ardently propagandistic of the group around Schlick. It 
was Neurath's conspicuous advocacy of crackpot schemes for 
'international planning for freedom' and for an ~economy in 
kind' as a substitute for prices andmarkets 11 which dissuaded 
Hayek from making overtures to the group after his interest 
had been sparked by his friend and fellow member of the Mises 
circle Felix Kaufmann. And as the case of Schlick himself 
surely makes clear, 12 it would be overly simplistic to see the 
circle in particular or Viennese scientific philosophy in general 
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as in any sense a part of the Austrian socialist movement. 
How, then, are we to explain the fact that, as far. as 
achievemen.t and wider influence is concerned, scientifically 
oriented philosophy of science was the dominant branch of 
philosophy in Austria? 
A more subtle answer to this question, deriving from the 
work of the Hungarian philosopher J. C, Nyiri, 13 might read as 
follows. On the one hand one can point to ihe fact that, while 
the Austrian Empire was the equal of Germany in the cultural 
field, it lagged behind its richer and more developed 
neighbour to the west in the spheres of intellect and science. 
The Habsburg Empire had witnessed a relatively late process 
of urbanisation, bringing also a late development of those 
libetal habits and values which would seem to be a necessary 
presupposition of the modern, scientific attitude. It therefore 
lacked .institutions and traditions of scientific research of the 
·sort that had been established and cultivated in Germany 
throughout the nineteenth century. On the other hand, as the 
more .liberal and enlightened ways began to be established in ' 
. Austria -· effectively in the . second. half of the nineteenth 
century ........ the desire to enjoy the various trappings of a 
·. jnodetn; erilighteried culture made itself strongly felt. The 
Austrians were not, however, in a position to summon forth 
· ".the ineap.s to create serious and reputable institutions and 
traditj.ons of science in. the narrow sense. This, as Nyiri puts it, 
created 'a vacuum which the theory of a practice so attractively 
· pursued elsewhere could then fill' 14 - a thesis illustrated 
partiCl\larly clearly by the case of Mach, whose lack of funds for 
serious experiments in physics seems to have constrained him 
tq turn .. instead to the (cheaper) fields of physiology and 
· .psycholi>gy, and. to the work in history and philosophy of 
science which occupied him especially at the end of his life. 
An account along these lines is supported' further by 
pointing to the absence in the Empire .of any entrenched 
national philosophy of the Kantian or ·Hegelian sort. This 
implied that, when the Jime came for the establishment of a 
modern and scientifically inspired philosophy in Austria, there 
was very little of substance against which the new philosophical 
developments had to compete. Catholic Austria was indeed 
largely free 'of the influence of German (Protestant) idealist 
metaphysics, 15 an influence which has done so much to thwart 
the development of exact philosophy in Germany itself. This 
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was not least in virtue of the fact that the works of both Kant 
and Hegel, as notorious effluvia of the French revolution, were 
for a time induded in the Papal index of prohibited books; 
Their place was taken by a peculiarly superficial form of 
scholasticism-larded, here and there, with bitS of Leibniz and 
Herbart, but still quite liter3.ny an inheritance of the middle 
ages. The canons and textbooks of this doctrine were imposed 
upon the. institutions of learning> throughout the Empire, a 
state of affairs which was to end only with the educational 
reform& after 1848, leaving the way clear for more positive 
developments, some of which willbe considered below. 
This is of course in contrast to the German case, where the 
strength of the idealist metaphysics had derived in no small 
part from the fact that it was closely associated with the 
development both of German nationalistic feeling and of the 
German nation itself. Kant, Hegel, Fichte and Schelling came 
thereby to occupy an entrenched position in German thought 
and feeling (comparable, perhaps; to the position of 
Catholicism in contemporary Poland or in the Irish Republic) . 
At no time was philosophy rooted in this way in the structure. of 
the AustHan state,' An Empire which was at bestan accidental 
compromise, a dynastic convenience of the Habsburg family 
itself, seemed indeed to be lacking in' all potential for legiti-
mation on the plane ofphilosophy.16 The primary legitimacy 
of the Empire was seen as lying much rather in its role as the 
last bulwark of Catholic Christianity against the expansionist 
powers of Russia and Turkey to the east. 
There is however a further reason for the absence in Austria 
of a counterpart to German idealist metaphysics. For the 
Austrians, similar in this respect to the English and the Scots, 
have tended to react with derisory suspicion in the face of 
'metaphysical systems' (when, that is to say, these are put 
forward as· the constructions of man). This may explain also 
why those native German philosophers who have favoured 
painstaking argument and ·careful empirical work over 
grandiose speculation have to an extent been able to find a 
receptive audience in Austrian universities. 17 
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TheNeurath-Haller thesis 
Much of the previous section consisted in the attempt to 
provide an explanation of developments in the intellectual or 
cultural. sphere by appeal to underlying social or econo~ic 
factors. (as the relative predominance of the coffee house m 
Austria might be made understandable by pointing to the 
long-standing shortage of adequate housing in the major cities . 
of.the Empire). Explanations of this kind have been found 
tempting both by Marxist thinkers and also by advocates of the 
new 'economic .approach . to human behaviour'. 18 Where, 
however, we are dealing with complex movements of thought 
and doctrine, they would seem to be at best only partial. For 
they cannot give us jnsight into the precise intellectual content 
of the. movements in question. Why did the Austrians' initial 
substitute for true scientific development take precisely these 
(alternatively phenomenalist and physicalist) forms, rather 
than those? What is to account for the peculiarhlend of British 
empiricism ·and Russellian. logic which provided .. the basic 
framework within which, in their various ways, the members of 
the Schlick circle would operate? 
Clearly, and for all the dominance of schools and 
movements in any particular case, it can only be by pointing to 
the influence of specific individuals that we shall provide truly 
satisfactory answers to questions such as these. And there are a 
number of candidate individuals whodoimmediately come to 
mind, including Boltzmann - whose vision of a unitary 
science made itself felt not only among physicists but also in the 
wider intellectual community in Vienna-and Wittgenstein -
whose Tractatus exerted a not inconsiderable influence on both 
Schlick and Carnap in precisely the formative years of the 
Vienna Circle. We may presume, reasonably, that no social or 
economic explanation of the genius of Boltzmann or 
Wittgenstein (or Godel, .or Einstein) would be forthcoming. 
Yet it would, on the other hand, be insufficient· for our 
purposes to look at individuals in abstraction from the wider 
social and institutional context in which they worked. For the 
individual will himself have been shaped by his surrounding 
culture, and his ideas will at least to some extent have been, 
determined thereby, whether.positively, through absorption, 
or negatively, through critical reaction. Moreover, these ideas 
will be able to take root in this surrounding culture only to the 
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extent that they strike a congenial chord in the thinking of 
those to whom they are addressed. Hence also an individual of 
genius will have a greater opportunity to influence the 
thinking of others to the extent that he has an oratorical or 
p~dagogical talent. Longevity, too, may play a not insignificant 
role. But further: a body of thought that is promulgated from 
a number of distinct centres and in such a way as to attract the 
representatives of a number of different disciplines will, other 
things being equal, have a greater chance of becoming influen-
tial; for it will have the opportunity to make an impression on 
the thinking of different members of its audience by degrees, 
by appealing simultaneously to their several competing 
interests. 
Most importantly, however, an individual, even an 
individual of genius, is able to exert an influence upon his 
contemporaries only to the extent that there are institutions 
~hich can facilitate the dissemination of his ideas. Hence there 
is a need, in regard to our own specific problem, to provide a 
mixed explanation, one that makes room both for social and 
·economic factors of the kind so far considered and also for the 
serendipitous role of individuals. A remarkably forceful and 
coherent explanation along these lines has been provided, 
ironically ~nm.J.gh, by the much-maligned Otto Neurath in the 
section labelled 'Prehistory' of the Vienna Circle manifesto 
already mentioned above, and I .shall here deal in turn with 
each of the four main components in Neurath's account. 
I. The fact that Vienna provided especially fertile soil for 
the development of the scientific C0,9._ception is, Neurath 
argues, 'historically understandable' first . of all as a 
consequence of the growth of liberalism in Vienna in the 
second.half of the nineteenth century. Indeed he claims that 
liberalism was in this period: ·· 
the dominant political current ~n Vienna. Its world of ideas 
stems from · the enlightenment, from empiricism, 
utilitarianism and the free trade movement of England. In 
Vienna's liberal movement, ~cholars of world renown 
occupied leading positions. Here an anti"metaphysical spirit· 
was cultivated, for instance, by men like Theodor Gomperz 
(who translated the works of J S. Mill), and by Suess, Jodi 
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and others. (Neurath, 1973, p. 301, translation amended 
slightly) 
This liberal atmosphere fostered also, Neurath telfs us, the 
development in Austria of scientifically oriented popular 
education --.,. leading eventually .to the school reform 
movement of the 1920s in which· Wittgenstein, ·perhaps 
inadvertently, participated. 
II. Mach, too, was a product of this Viennese liberal 
enlightenment, which was as it were compressed, in Austria, 
into the short span of a few decades. His formative years as · 
student and 1:rivatdozent were spent in Vienna, where. his 
political attitudes ~ subsequently. to reveal themselves in his 
activities as Rector oft.he still unified University of Prague -
were also shaped .. These same attitudes then manifested 
themselves also, Neurath suggests, in Mach's philosophy of 
science,. and specifically in his attempt to 'purify' empirical 
science of metaphysical notions: 
We recall his critique of absolute space which made him a 
forerunnerofEinstein, his struggle against the metaphysics 
of the thing-in-itself and of the conceptof substance, and his 
investigations of the construction of the concepts cif science 
from ultimat~ elements, namely, sense data. (Neurath, 
1973, p. 302) 
The influence of Mach and of his successor Boltzmann, 
Neurath nciw argues, !makes it understandable' whythere was 
in Vienna 'a lively dominant interest in th~ epistemological and 
logical problems that are linked with the foundations of 
physics' (Neurath 1973, p.302). This influence was, certainly, 
of lasting importance, despite the fact that, after only six years 
as professor in Vienna, Mach was forced by ill-health to retire. 
Thus Hayek, for example, reports that he and his contem-
poraries on arriving in Vienna to take up their studies in the 
immediate post-war years 'found in Mach almost the only 
arguments against a metaphysical and mystificatory attitude' 
such as was manifested by the dominant philosophers in the 
University at the time: 
from Mach one was then led on to Helmholtz, to Poincare 
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. to· similar thinkers, and of cour~, ·for those who went into 
·the matter systematically such as my friend Karl Popper, to 
all the natural scientists and philosophers of the period. 
(Hayek, 1960, p.421) 
The quite special importance of Mach for the Vienna Circle 
itself can be seen in the fact that they gave the name 'Verein 
Ernst Mach' to the,public lecture society which they founded, 
as ·a supplement to their other activities, in 1929. 
Iii. Neurath mentions also a number of Viennese social 
thinkers, from both the Marxist and the non-Marxist camps, 
who had 'served consciously in the spirit of the enlightenment' 
in the late nineteenth century.19 Above all he mentions the 
work of Carl Menger; .pointing out that 'in the sphere of 
political economy, too, a rigorously scientific method was culti-
vated by the ·school of marginal utility' which Menger had 
founded in 1871. Menger's methodological individualistic 
doctrines, especially as developed by Mises and by Hayek, can 
indeed be seen as standing in opposition to German historicist 
· and collectivist doctrines in the sphere of economics in a way 
that parallels the opposition <if, say, Bolzano or Mach to Kant 
and Hegel. Moreover, these doctrines constitute a synthesis of 
liberal political and economic ideas with the affirmation of the 
importance of scientific rigour of just the sort that is required 
by Neurath's thesis~20 
IV. Apart from' Mach; however, the most important 
individual philosopher mentioned by Neurath in his account 
of the Viennese prehistory of logical positivism is Franz 
Brentano. The ground was cleared for the endeavours of the 
Vienna Circle in the direction of a reform of logic and of a 
concern with problems of foundations also, as Neurath himself 
puts it, 'from quite another quarter': 
through Fra~z Brentano (professor of philosophy ... from 
1874 to 1880, later Dozent in the philosophical faculty). As a 
·Catholic priest Brentano had an understanding for scholas-
ticism; he started directly from the scholastic logic and from 
Leibniz's endeavours to reform logic,. while leaving aside 
Kant and the idealist system-philosophers. Brentano and 
his students showed time and again their understanding of 
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men like Bolzano and others who were working towards a 
rigorous new foundation oflog!c (Neurath, 1973, p.302) 
Brentano, too, was marked by the Austrian liberalism of the 
nineteenth century (thus for example he played an instru-
mental role in commissioning the young Sigmund Freud -
who had been for a time a devoted admirer ofBrentano's work 
- to translate one of the volumes in the already mentioned 
Gomperz edition of the works of Mill21 ). Of Brentano's 
students, Neurath mentions in particular Alois Hofler (1853-
1922), who had organised numerous discussions on 
Brentanian perspectives in logic and foundations under the 
auspices of the. Philosophical Society at the University of 
Vienna, a forum in which, as Neurath puts it, 'the adherents of 
the scientific world conception were strongly represented'.22 
Neurath mentions also 'Alexius von Meinong, a member of 
Brentano's Viennese Circle from 1870-1882 and later 
professor in Graz, whose theory of objects has certainly some 
affinity to modern theories of· concepts'. (Neurath is 
presumably referring here to the similarities - pointed out 
also by Carnap ~ between Meinong's work on higher order 
objects and Carnap's Logical Structure of the World. 23) He 
mentions also Meinong's pupil Ernst Mally, who had been one 
of the first Austrians to work on t.he logic of Whitehead and 
Russell and would later play a seminal role in the development 
of deontic logic. 
Brentano, for all his scholastic background, was not only 
sympathetic to a rigorously scientific method of philosophy; he 
shared with the logical positivists also a certain anti-
metaphysical orientation24 and his work involves the use of 
methods oflanguage an,,alysis similar, in some respects, to those 
developed later by philosophers in England. The distin-
guished Graz philosopher Rudolf Haller has indeed argued 
that it makes sense to point to these features - which were 
shared in common not only by Brentano and the logical 
positivists but also by thinkers as diverse as M.ach and 
Wittgenstein - as constituting what might be called a 'typically 
Austrian philosophy'.25 Hailer's writings on the history of 
Austrian philosophy26 have not merely extended and clarified 
the Neurath interpretation; they have also contributed to our 
understanding of German~language philosophy as a whole. 
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For Haller has shown that it is possible to distinguish within this 
whole a coherent alternative to ·the speculative idealisms 
predominant in. Germany proper. But now, if this Neurath-
Haller thesis can be accepted, it follows that the Vienna Circle 
itself comes to be linked, via Brentano, to Catholic scholasti-
cism. Indeed one could go further and point to the method of 
communal philosophical argument - ofphilosophising by 
means of a sometimes ritualised process of discussion - as 
something that is shared, not merely by Brentano and the 
medieval schoolmen, but also by Schlick, with his Thursday 
evening discussions, and indeed by Wittgenstein in his cell in 
Cambridge. 
· The Neurath-Haller thesis .is not without its problems 
however. Thus it seems that in the actual discussions of the 
Vienna Circle the works of Meinong or Hofler or Mally - to 
say nothing of the medievals - were hardly mentioned, and 
Brentano himself was discussed only because his work on 
ethics was chosen by Schlick as a special object of criticism. 
The thesis has been attacked most especially by the Viennese 
sociologist.left, which of course cannot stomach the idea that 
the 'two camps' of Catholic reaction and progressive socialist 
neopositivism should become confused together in the way 
described. Friedrich Stadler, in particular, has suggested that 
~in contrast to the picture of the typical Austrian philosopher 
painted by Neurath and Haller - the influence of logical 
positivistideas, or of scientific philosophy in general, was in 
fact rather small, at least as concerns the official life of Vienna 
University in the period 1918-38. What predominated, both in 
lecture courses and in dissertation topics, was rather the 
history of philosophy of a.rather old~fashioned sort, dealing in 
Kant, Schopenhauer, Spinoza, Plato, Nietzsche. The circle 
around Sch.lick can be seen from this point of view to have 
consisted largely of philosophical outsiders or cranks, of 
individuals who would in fact be taken seriously only sometime 
later - and only without the boundaries of Austria herself. 
What is important for our purposes, however, is not the 
education of the inter-war generation in Vienna, the gener~ 
ation which would come of age in the period (say) 1939-45. 
Rather, we are interested in those intellectual currents which 
had shaped and determined the thinking of specific members 
of the generation already mature in the inter-war period, and 
in particular given rise to such schools as the Schlick and Mises 
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circles. And to pick out such currents it will not suffice simply 
to examine the sheer numbers of lectures or dissertations on 
different themes-for this is to ignore just those differences of 
quality, achievement and wider influence which are here all-
important. 
The school of Franz Brentano 
Franz Brentano (1838-1917) was born in Marienberg, near 
Boppard on the Rhine, of a distinguished Italian-German 
family whose forbears included Clemens Brentano, Carl von 
Savigny and Bettina von Arnim. He studied in Berlin under 
the .Aristotle scholar Adolf Trendelenburg, and later in 
Wiirzburg, where he took holy orders in 1864 and where, from 
1866, he taught philosophy. In part as a result of difficulties in 
accepting the dogma of Papal infallibility, Brentano withdrew 
from the priesthood in .1873 and this necessitated also a 
withdrawal from Wiirzburg. In 1874 he was appointed 
professor of philosophy in Vienna, where he taughtfor some 
twenty years with great success; Brentano movedtmFlorence in 
1896 and from there to Zurich in 1915, where he died two. 
years later. 27 
Brentano remained a quite singularly powerful figure in 
Austrian philosophy even when, for technical reasons 
connected with his marriage as an ex-priest, he was forced to 
resign his chair in 1880. It is one of the tragedies of Austrian 
philosophy that, due to the repeated interventions of the 
Emperor, Brentano was not re-appointed to a professorial post 
in Vienna after his marriage, despite the fact that, year after 
year, his re-election to such a post was carried unico voco by the 
faculty itself. Brentano remained in Vienna as a mere Privat-
dozent until 1895. He was thereby able to exert his influence in 
Vienna as a teacher, but his students and disciples were largely 
forced to turn elsewhere in order to pursue their philosophical 
careers. Had Brentano been able truly to establish himself and 
his school in the University of Vienna, then it seems clear that 
the philosophy of Austria in this century would have been 
significantly different. It may, therefore, have been a 
somewhat ironic consequence of the Emperor's veto of 
Brentano's appointment in the name of Christian propriety, 
that he thereby left the way clear in Vienna for just such 
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positivistic and atheistic movements of thought as were 
promulgated by Schlick and his circle in the 20s and 30s .. 
Another consequence was that Brentanian ideas came to 
predominate in other centres of learning both within and 
without the Empire. Thus centres of Brentanian or of 
Brentano-inspired thought were established particularly in 
Prague and in Lemberg, and Brentano's students held chairs 
also in Graz and Czernowitz, as well as in Berlin, where 
Stumpf, formerly in Prague, was professor in the University 
for over thirty years. 
Brentano's influence was not restricted to philosophers. 
Among those who came under his spell were also a number of 
important thinkers in the Church, as well as such figures as T. 
G. Masaryk, later President of the Czechoslovak Republic. 
What is most remarkable about .Brentano, however, is the 
extent to which his most important philosophical heirs -
Kasimir Twardowski in Lemberg, Christian von Ehrenfels and 
Anton Marty in Pr~gue, Carl Stumpf in Prague and Berlin, as 
well as Meinong and Husserl-have distinguished themselves 
by the power and originality of their thinking, which 
amounted in each. case to a more or less radical transformation 
of Brentanian ideas. 28Moreover each had influential students 
of his own, to the extent that, leaving aside certain exclusively 
Anglo-Saxon developments, a table ofBrentano's students and 
of his students' students would come close to embracing all of 
the most important philosophical movements of the twentieth 
century, 
Twardowski (1866-1938) was born in Vienna and took his· 
PhD under Brentano with a dissertation on Descartes in 1892. 
After a short period as Privatdozent in Vienna he moved to 
Lemberg in 1895. On the basis of work on logic and psychology 
inspired by Brentano (and due in no small part to his own 
brilliance as a teacher), he then went on to establish almost 
single-handedly a tradition of exact philosophy in Poland 
which was to include all of the important figures of the Polish 
philosophical renaissance of the first decades of the present 
century. 29 Thus present at different times in Lemberg and 
falling under Twardowski's influence were, inter alia, the 
historian Wladyslaw Tatarkiewicz, the phenomenologist and 
aesthetician Roman Irigarden, the logicians St. Lesniewski, Jan 
Lukasiewicz and Tadeusz Czei:owski, the. already mentioned 
Ludwik Fleck,30 as well as philosophers later sympathetic to the 
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Vienna logical empiricist movement such as Tadeusz Kotar-
binski and Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz.31 Members of the circle 
around Twardowski were gradually transplanted to Warsaw, 
where Le8niewski, especially, was domina,nt, and it was from 
there that contacts with the Vienna Circle were initiated in the 
spring of 1930 by Alfred Tarski. Carnap in turn visited Warsaw 
in November of that year. He gave lectures to the Warsaw 
Philosophical Society and had discussions with Lesniewski, 
Kotarbinski and Tarski, at just about the time when Tarski 
himself was developing his semantic conception of truth.32 
Ehrenfels (1859-1932), professor in Prague for more than 
thirty years, was above all responsible, together with his 
student Max Wertheimer, for initiating that _revolution in 
psycl;iological research which is associated with the concept of 
Gestalt, a revolution to which contributions were made also by 
Ehrenfels' teacher Meinong in Graz and subsequently by 
Buhler in Vienna.33 Meinong's followers would go on to 
establish a school of Gestalt psychology that is still influential in 
Italy today, and not least in the former Imperial-and-Royal 
Port City of Triest. The group around Buhler (to which 
incidentally the yo:ing Karl Popper belonged), promulgated a 
naturalistic philosophy of Gestalten similar, in many respects, 
to the work of Stumpf. Buhler's student Egon Brunswik, 
especially, was to make importantcontributions to this Vienna 
Gestalt psychology before allying himself with the neopositivist 
movement newly transplanted to America and serving as one 
of the advisory editors to the International Encyclopedia of 
Unified Science founded by Neurath in 1938. 
Marty (1847-1914) was a native of Switzerland who, 
following the example of his teacher Brentano in Wiirzburg, 
took holy orders in 1870. He was professor, successively, in 
Czernowitz and Prague, and was responsible for applying 
Brentano's ideas in the areas of linguistics and the philosophy 
of language, where his writings anticipated a number of 
aspects of contemporary work on linguistic universals. Marty 
played a role also in the early developmentofBrentanian ideas 
on language in the direction of a theory of speech acts,34 and 
exerted an influence in this respect both on Buhler and his 
followers in Vienna and also on Jakobson and other members 
of the Prague linguistic circle. 
The philosophical atmosphere in Prague in the first decades 
of the twentieth century had of course been determined to no 
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small extent by the work of physicists such as Mach, Einstein 
and Frank. Yet it is clear that Marty, Stumpf, Ehrenfels and 
other Breritanians - as well as phenomenologically-oriented 
psychologists such as Ewald Hering - played a no less 
important role in determining the scientific orientation of 
Prague philosophy. Moreover, whilst the two groups were 
doctrinally at loggerheads, particularly over the theory of 
relativity itself, which Brentano charged with incoherence, 
there were examples Of amicable collaboration across this 
doctrinal divide: Thus Einstein was to be a, life-long friend of 
Wertheimer,35 and also of Marty's student and assistant Hugo 
Bergmann, who was in tum a close friend of Franz Kafka and 
had done much to encourage the latter to attend the 
philosophy lectures ofEhrenfels, Marty and other Brentanists 
as part of his studies in the German University. Bergmann had 
also initiated Kafka· into the mysteries of the already 
mentioned Brentanist discussion group in Prague. Initially, as 
Bergmann writes, the group had 
called itself:the 'Louvre Circle' after the Louvre coffeehouse 
where we used to gather. Later on, we got together in the 
drawing-room of my then mother-in-law, Berta Sohr-Fanta, 
where Einstein was a frequent visitor when we were reading 
Hegel's 'Phenomenology of the Spirit'. I scarcely remember 
whether Einstein took part in these readings. Yet I well 
" recall a popular lecture he held before this .score of non-
physicists on the special theory of relativity. (Bergmann, 
1974, p.389) 
Bergmann himself was_ the author of books on Brentano's 
concept of evidence and on the philosophy ofBolzano, dealing 
especially with the latter's logic and philosophy of mathema-
tics. On the other hand however he was the author of a volume 
on The Controversy Concerning the Law of Causality in Contem-
porary Physics, dedicated 'In memory of my teacher Anfon 
Marty' and described by Einstein in his Foreword to the book as 
'promoting the best in our present-day attempts at merging 
physical and philosophical thought'.36 
Stumpf(l848-1936) was born in the village ofWiesentheid 
in Lower Franconia (Bavaria) from where he moved to the 
University of Wurzburg in 1865. In 1866 he began a close 
collaboration with Brentano which extended across the period 
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1866. to 1874 when Brentano left for Vienna. Stumpf himself 
was professor in Wilrzburg from 1873, before leaving for 
Prague in 1879 and going on from there to Halle in 1884, 
where he would serve for a time as teacher and colleague of 
Husserl. After a period in Munich, Stumpf was called in 1894 
to serve as professor of philosophy in Berlin with the explicit 
task of establishing there an institute of psychology. It was in 
this institute that his most important students and 
collaborators-Wertheimer, again, but also Wolfgang Kohler, 
Kurt Koffka and Kurt Lewin - would establish the so-called 
Berlin school of Gestalt psychology. 
Stumpfs influence on his Gestaltist students was two-fold. 
On the one hand he gave them a rigorous training, especially in 
the philosophical foundations of psychology37 - echoing in 
this respect the work of his own teacher Brentano. And on the 
other hand he conveyed to them an understanding of and a 
respect for philosophy as a scientific enterprise in its own right 
- as a science of the most general properties (both material 
and psychological) of what is real. Philosophy therefore stands 
to the physical and psychological sciences in much the same 
relation as, say, logic to the sciences of language. 
This philosophical background was indispensable to the 
initial successes of. the Gestaltist enterprise as a research 
programme in psychology. Indeed it seems quite generally to 
have been those thinkers who have had powerful convictions as 
to the importance of philosophy as a discipline in its own right 
who have exerted the strongest influence on developments in 
science proper, as contrasted with, say, the thinkers of the 
Vienna Circle, who saw philosophy as very much an inferior 
aid to science. The Vienna Circle has in fact given rise to almost 
no truly creative developments in the extra-philosophical 
sphere: even the early work of Godel seems hardly to have 
been affected by the efforts of Schlick et al., and Gode!'s later 
philosophy was, notoriously, closer to the metaphysics of a 
Leibniz or a Husserl than to the anti-metaphysical attitudes of 
his erstwhile Viennese contemporaries. 
The Stumpfian Naturphilosophie led to a quite particular 
concern with the problem of demarcation of the sciences, 
inspiring Stumpfs student Kurt Lewin, in his study of the 
different concepts of identity presupposed by the different 
sciences, to develop the notion of 'genidentity' - for example 
of two successive states of a single organism or physical system 
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- a notion which was then adopted by Carnap in his works in 
logic. The same theme of demarcation of the sciences was 
taken up by Schlick in one of his earliest philosophical writings 
(1910), and the fact that other early publications of Schlick, 
too, are devoted to markedly Stumpfian themes, taken 
together with the respectful refeqences to Stumpf in Schlick's 
General Theory of Knowledge,38 may suggest that there was some 
influence of Stumpf during the time (1900-1904) when 
Schlick was studying physics in Berlin. This hypothesis is to 
some extent supported by the fact that the Berlin Philosophical 
Faculty was in those days still not divided into separate faculties 
for the Natur- and Geisteswissenschaften. 
Perhaps the clearest illustration of the close links between 
scientific philosophy in Berlin and Vienna is provided by the 
case of the Austrian novelist Robert Musil. Musil studied under 
Stumpf in Berlin from 1903 to 1908, writing his doctorate on 
the philosophy of Mach. 39 He enjoyed friendly contacts in this 
period with Gestalt psychologists such as Kohler and von 
Allesch, and Gestaltist ideas make themselves felt at a number 
of places in Musil's novel The Man Without Qualities. Musil was 
indeed tempted, on completing his studies in Berlin, to accept 
an invitation from Meinong to serve as his assistant in Graz. 
But he enjoyed contacts with the positivists, also, and particu-
larly with Richard von Mises in whose home in Berlin he was a 
regular guest. 
N eurath, too, studied in Berlin in the early years of the 
century, and so also, from 1906 to 1908, did Ludwig Wittgen-
stein. For our purposes here, however, it is the manifold links 
between the Berlin Gestalt theorists and a later generation of 
scientific philosophers in Berlin that will be of importance. 
Thus we know that Kurt Lewin was involved with Carnap and 
Reichenbach in the earliest efforts to cultivate a tradition of 
scientific philosophy in Germany, and both he and Kohler 
actively participated in the discussions of the Reichenbach 
group in Berlin.40 Lewin's paper on the transition from 
Aristotelian to Galilean modes of thought in biology and 
psychology was published in the first volume of Erkenntnis, and 
a paper by Kohler on Boltzmann appeared in volume two of 
the same journal. Kohler's book on Physical Gestalten at Rest and 
in the Stationary State: An Investigation in Natural Philosophy 
( 1920), an attempt to show that the Gestalt structures given in 
experience and in the world of organic matter are present also 
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in the purely physical realm, was greeted by many of the 
neopositivists as a substantive contribution to just that 'unity of 
science' which they themselves were advocating in their 
philosophical writings. 
Positivist philosophy had until this time - largely as a result 
of the efforts of Mach and his British empiricist predecessors 
- been associated with the doctrines of elementarism, 1Vith the 
view that the ultimate constituents of reality and of experience 
are 'elements' or 'atoms'. Thus, Carnap's new Viennese 
phenomenalism, too, started out from the view that reality can 
be understood as a 'meaningless complex' of sensory elements,41 
a development that was stimulated also by certain logically 
atomistic implications of the new logic of Whitehead and 
Russell, as also by the work of Wittgenstein. Carnap however, 
under the influence of Wertheimer and Kohler, saw that there 
were reasons to reject this elementarist view. Thus he took as 
the basis of his system in The Logical Structure of the World not 
elements but necessarily unanalysable 'instantaneous total 
experiences'42 (though the Gestaltists could rightly object that 
even this concession ignores the fact that our experiences are 
organised structurally not only within each instant but also 
across time). Ayer, too, was sensitive to the Gestaltist challenge, 
as is shown by his remark in Language, Truth and Logic to the 
effect that 'our empiricism is not logically dependent on an 
atomistic psychology, such as Hume and Mach adopted, but is 
compatible with any theory whatsoever concerning the actual 
characteristics of our sensory fields' ( 1936, p.122). 43 
A special role in the attempts by the Austro-German logical 
positivists to come to terms with the Gestaltist challenge was 
played by a series of papers by Kurt Grelling and Paul 
Oppenheim, the first of which, on 'The Concept of Gestalt in 
the Light of Modern Logic' was published in volume seven of 
Erkenntnis in 1938.44 The paper was designed to defend the 
Gestaltist position against (not entirely unjustified) charges 
that much of the then current talk of psychological and other 
sorts of 'wholes not reducible to the sums of their parts' was 
either meaningless or inherently confused. The aim of the 
paper was therefore 'to suggest definitions which accomplish 
the following: when the concepts thus determined are approp-
riately inserted into sentences which appear characteristic of 
the Gestalt theorists, these sentences turn out neither trivial 
nor empty of sense'.45 
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Oppenheim was an example of that rare breed, a philosophi-
cally-minded banker, rich enough to pay philosophers to serve 
as his co-authors in a series of works in the philosophy of 
science published in the period 1938 to 1978. One of the first 
such ventures was his paper with Grelling on Gestalt. He 
collaborated also, inter alia, with Hempel - a peculiar volume 
entitled The Concept of Type in the Light of Modern Logic ( 1936), an 
analysis of the work on human typology of psychologists such 
as Lewin, Kretschmer, and Jaensch - and with Nicholas 
Rescher - again on the 'Logical Analysis of Gestalt Concepts' 
- as well as writing a series of books and papers of his own on 
the demarcation and 'natural order' of scientific disciplines 
and on the 'static and dynamic laws of the formation of scien-
tific concepts'. ·. 
Husserl (1859-1938), whose unequalled influence on the 
philosophy of continental Europe in the twentieth century 
needs no commentary, was responsible for transforming 
Brentano's 'descriptive psychology' into his own somewhat 
more ambitious-sounding enterprise of 'phenomenology'. 
Like so many others, Husserl was won for philosophy by the 
power of Brentano's thinking and teaching. As he himself put 
it in 1932: 'Without Brentano I should have written not a single 
word of philosophy.' 
The superficial view of the relations between 
phenomenology and the logical positivists has long centred 
around Carnap's attack in the second volume of Erkenntnis on 
the 'metaphysical nonsense' of Heidegger's Sein und Zeit. Thus 
it has been readily assumed that phenomenology as a whole 
appeared to Carnap and his associates as just another example 
of the bad old metaphysics which the Vienna positivist 
movement was out to vanquish.46 The two camps were, 
certainly, at odds with each other in central points of doctrine. 
Thus it was the phenomenologist Roman Ingarden who 
presented one of the first formulations of the now familiar 
criticism of the Vienna circle verifiability criterion of meaning 
- that the criterion is itself meaningless by its own lights - at 
the Prague World Congress of Philosophy in 1934.47 When 
one look~ more closely, however, one sees that there are a 
number of respects in which Schlick and his circle were influ-
enced by Husserl's phenomenology, even if only in the sense 
that, as in the case of the Gestaltist movement, phenomenology 
provided a substantive and influential group of problems 
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which the positivists felt called upon to solve (or at least to do 
away with, by whatever means). 
As has often been noted, the very project of phenomenology . 
- the project of basing philosophy on a painstakingly 
~~eq~ate description of what is given in experience precisely as 
1t 1s given - can be regarded simply as a more comprehensive 
and radical version of phenomenalism in the traditional sense, 
so th~t Hermann Liibbe, for example, finds no difficulty in 
assertmg that 'Ernst Mach and other critical empiricists, 
regardless of their "positivism", belong in the tradition of 
phenomenology'.48 The two strands of Austrian positivist 
philosophy were indeed at one stage so closely intertwined that 
Husserl could be considered as a potential successor to Mach in 
the chair in Vienna.49 Guido Kung, more recently, has 
defended the view that there are quite specific parallels 
between Husserlian phenomenology and the project of 'expli-
cation' that is defended by Carnap in his The Logical Structure of 
the World. A view of this sort was indeed advanced already in 
1932 by Ernst Polak, a student of Schlick in Vienna, in a clearly 
Wittgenstein-inspired dissertation entitled Critique of 
Phenomenology by Means of Logic. The sense of phenomenology, 
according to Polak, 'is logic (grammar in the most general 
sense), clarification of what we mean when we speak; its results 
are tautologies; its findings not statements, but explications' 
(1932, p.157). 
As is seen from Wittgenstein's own repeated employment of 
the terminology of 'phenomenology', particularly around 
1929, it is primarily in regard to the problem of the synthetic a 
priori, of an 'intermediary between logic and physics', that 
Husserl's thinking is crucial to the development of Austrian 
positivi~m. Husserl's account of the synthetic a priori is indeed 
no less important to the Vienna circle than that of Kant, 50 for 
where K~nt sees th~ realm of the synthetic a priori as residing in 
the relauvely restncted and practically inaccessible sphere of 
transcendental consciousness, Husserl claims that there is a 
directly accessible a priori dimension in the entire range of 
everyday experience - so that vastly more propositions turn 
out to be synthetic and a priori on Husserl's view than on that of 
Kant, including such homely examples as 'nothing can be both 
red and green all over' to which the logical positivists devoted a 
gre~~ ~ea! of their attentions.51 From the standpoint of the 
pos1t1V1sts, of course, synthetic a priori propositions do not and 
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cannot exist: all true propositions are either tautologies oflogic 
or contingent truths relating to matters of fact. From the 
Husserlian perspective, in contrast, there are entire disciplines 
of synthetic a priori truths, including the discipline of 
phenomenology- and it is fascinating to observe the extent to 
which the positivists are driven to unsupported claims as to the 
'logical' character of Husserl's theses in the face of the quite 
evidently extra-logical or 'material' character of his examples. 
Brentano and scientific philosophy 
Our conclusion, then, is that European logical positivism is a 
part of the exact philosophical. heritage of Brentano. More 
specifically, it is a reflection of the interplay of the intellectual 
and institutional influence of Brentano and his school with 
developments in logic and in the philosophy of physics 
inspired by Russell and Wittgenstein and by Mach and his 
successors in Vienna and Prague. 
What, precisely, are the implications of a view of this sort? It 
suggests first of all - as I hope has become clear from the 
foregoing - that one needs to look again, and more closely, at 
the relationship between logical positivism on the one hand 
and Gestalt theory and phenomenology on the other. But still 
more importantly it suggests that there may be benefits to be 
gained from the examination of Brentano's own conception of 
philosophy and of its relations to the different sciences. 
Brentano is, clearly, a somewhat paradoxical figure. We 
have already referred above to Kurt Lewin's paper on the 
transition from 'Aristotelian' to 'Galilean' modes of thought in 
modern science. This paper is an echo of a much earlier piece 
by Brentano entitled 'Auguste Comte and the Positive 
Philosophy',52 in which Brentano expounds Comte's doctrine 
of the 'phases' of philosophical development from the fictive 
and anthropomorphic thinking of theological and 
metaphysical philosophy to the scientific thinking of that 
modern 'positive' philosophy which seeks to establish the 
'general laws governing the connections between facts'. 
Brentano had already three years earlier set forth the funda-
mental elements of this scientific mode of philosophising -
very much in. the spirit of Comte - in the twenty-five 'Habili-
tation Theses' which he defended in Wiirzburg in 1866. The 
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most influential of these theses, which was chosen by Richard 
von Mises as a motto for his textbook on positivism, reads as 
follows: 'Vera philosophiae methodus nulla alia nisi scientiae 
naturalis est.' (The true method of philosophy is none other 
than that of the natural sciences.)53 Brentano held indeed that 
the method of the natural sciences is common to all the 
sciences, so that he is, in this respect at least, an advocate of the 
unity of science. Thus also he is critical of the view of the 
German philosopher Wilhelm Dilthey according to which the 
so-called Geisteswissenschaften or human or moral sciences 
would somehow call for a special method of understanding or 
Verstehen, as· opposed to the 'explanation' of the natural 
sciences. 
The first of Brentano's theses is a repudiation of (German) 
metaphysics as a whole: 
Philosophia neget oportet; scientias in speculativas et 
exactas dividi posse; qilod si non recte negaretur, esse earn 
ipsam jus non esset (Philosophy must protest against the 
division of the sciences into the speculative and the exact, 
and the justification of this protest is what justifies its own 
existence), 
a view which sits neatly- and bravely- alongside the second 
thesis: 
Philosophia et eos, qui earn prmc1p1a sua a Theologia 
sumere volunt, et eos rejicere debet, qui, nisi sit super-
naturalis revelatio, earn omnem operam perdere conten-
dunt. (Philosophy must protest against the presumption of 
taking its principles from theology and against the assertion 
that it is only through the existence of a supernatural 
revelation that a fruitful philosophy becomes possible.) 
Brentano in fact went so far as to protest against the view that 
universities should contain faculties of theology, precisely 
because theology cannot live up to the standards of science 
proper. 
What, then, were these standards? Briefly, we can say that 
Brentano was an empiricist in the Aristolelian sense. The 
thirteenth of his theses reads: 'Nihil est in intellectu, quod non 
prius fuerit in sensu, nisi intellectus ipse.' (Nothing is in the 
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intellect which. was not previously in the senses, except the 
intellect itself.)54It is in this sense that we are to understand the 
title ofBrentano's masterpiece, the Psychology from an Empi,rical 
Standpoint of 1874. Brentano took empiricism to ~mp.Iy th~t 
there are in fact two sources of knowledge: what 1s given m 
intuition, i.e. in outer and inner perception, and what is given 
through the logical analysis of concepts. Most importantly, 
however, he differed from empiricists sµch as Hume or Mach, 
in his belief that truly scientific knowledge, a knowledge of 
general laws, is possible on these two pillars as basis. 
Scientific induction is understood by Brentano as the 
process of establishing general laws starting from the ?bser-
vation of particular facts - as opposed to that other kmd of 
induction which attempts to use given particular facts merely 
as a starting point for predicting other particular facts. Scien-
tific induction is therefore not, as it was for Hume and Mach, a 
matter of habit. The intuition of lines and points, and of 
ourselves as intuiters of lines and points; gives us knowledge of 
the concepts of geometry. The combination of this intuiµon 
with processes of deductive reasonin? may then lead t? 
evident, insightful laws in the geometncal sphere. And this 
same combination ofintuition and deduction can be employed 
to yield the basic concepts and associated evident laws also in 
qther spheres of sci~ntific investig~tio~ .. But it is necessary t? 
start in each case with a mode of mtmt1ve knowledge that is 
predsely appropriate to the relevant objects of.investig~tion, 
just as they are given in experience. Brentano 1s accordmgly 
opposed, in his understanding of the properly scientific 
method, to the attitude of reductionism so characteristic of the 
later positivist proponents of physicalism and related 
doctrines. 
One might, now, be tempted to suppose that Brentano's talk 
of 'intuition', 'evidence' or 'insightfulness' is entirely alien to 
the tradition of Viennese positivism. Many of the positivists' 
critical writings are indeed devoted to the attempted refutation 
of claims made on behalf of intuition as a means of gaining 
knowledge in favour of the (public, scientific, repeatable) 
'observation' for which the positivists themselves had opted. 
Schlick, too, in chapter two of his General Theory of Knowledge, 
criticises what he takes to be Brentano's (and Stumpfs and 
Husserl's) views concerning intuition and evidence. If, 
however, one looks more closely at Schlick's own theory of 
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'observation statements', one discovers that he has himself 
presupposed precisely the views that he had earlier criticised. 55 
For Schlick, in contrast to a relativist such as Neurath, 
believes that there are foundations for knowledge, that is, that 
there are statements which are self-evident, i.e. not such as to 
derive their evidence from some other sphere. The process of 
understanding such statements is therefore 'at the same time 
the process of verifying them; I grasp their meaning at the 
same time as I grasp their truth'. 56 Such observation statements 
are therefore like simple tautologies in that our knowledge of 
their truth is immediate, so that there is no room for our being 
deceived. But they differ from tautologies in that they supply 
us with 'genuine knowledge of reality'. 
Schlick's own preferred example of an observation 
statement is '[There is] yellow here now'. As Chisholm points 
out however, if this statement is to be immune to deception 
then it can involve noreference to any external yellow sens um, 
but must involve reference only to our own present way of 
experiencing, so that it might best be rendered 'I am-
appeared-to-yellowly'. But now, as Chisholm shows, this is to 
imply that Schlick's observation statements belong to the class 
of statements expressing experiences which are immediately 
evident in precisely the Brentanian sense. 
The Brentanian method of intuition and deduction is, be it 
noted, prior to experimentation in the familiar sense. 
Brentano held that, while experimentation may occasionally 
lead to new or more adequate intuitions, it must none the less 
be the case that a properly experimental science can arise only 
when its basic concepts and laws have been established by 
intuition and deduction in tlie way suggested. For the experi-
mental scientist who has not first established the nature of the 
entities with which he deals is in a certain sense experimenting 
in the dark. Measurement for measurement's sake and the 
blind formulation of purely functional correlations may, by 
accident, lead to predictions of future particular facts. But it 
cannot lead to the kind of deductive luminosity which, as 
Brentano insisted, is the hallmark of a scientific law in the 
fullest sense. 
There is of course much in the above brief statement of 
Brentano's position that is in need of further clarification. 
What has been said should however suffice to establish one 
central feature of Brentano's thinking, namely his high 
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estimation of the importance and of the powers of science- to 
the extent that he saw science as embracing philosophy itself as 
a proper part. And it is perhaps this vision of the great unita? 
edifice of science which did most to colour the thought of his 
Austrian successors. 
Notes 
l. I should like to thank Heiner Rutte, Karl Schuhmann, Peter 
Simons, Jan Wolenski and also the editor for helpful comments on an 
earlier version of this paper. . . 
2. While Vienna and Budapest were the twm Imperial-and-Royal 
(k.u.k.) capitals of the Habsburg Empire as a who!~, the ruler of the 
non-Hungarian Imperial-Royal (k.~.) part ~f the Empire ~as at one and 
the same time Emperor of Austna and Kmg of Bohemia. 
3 These were often dedicated to no one single area of interest, 
refl~cting the unofficial ~nterdis~iplinary et~os of Austrian uni.ver~ity 
education in the period m question (See Smith 1981 for some md1ca-
tions of the workings of this ethos in the speci~c case of K,afka) 
4. See, again, Smith 1981, which also contams _some d1scuss1on ~f 
the ways in which Brentanian ideas may have mfluenced Kafka s 
writings. 
5. See Haller and Rutte, 1977, p. 25. . . . 
6. Another native Austrian who deserves mention m this 
connection might be Edmund Husserl'. author inter alia of impor~ant 
early works in the philosophy_ of logic ~nd lai:guage. ?ne might 
mention also Hayek, himself a d1st~nt cousm ?fW1t.t~enstem, who was 
the author not only of now familiar works m po~1t1cal economy but 
also of a Mach-inspired treatise on the foundations of psycholo~y 
(1952a: the initial draft dates from arou.nd 1~20), as also ofa work m 
the history and philosophy of the sooal sciences (~ 952b). ?r one 
might mention the Hungarian philosoph~r .a.nd sooal theonst Karl 
Mannheim, regarded by many as the m1t1ator of the so-called 
'sociology of knowledge'. , . . . 
7. For a bibliography of Flecks "'.ntmg~ see Schnelle, 1982. 
8. This thesis can be extended, with a pmch of salt, even to th~ case 
of Frege, whose importance for logi~ was in no small part established 
through the mediation ofWittgenstem (as also, of course, through the 
work of Russell, Carnap, and others). The thesis _applies also to the 
case of Hermann Wey!, whose philosophy of science was strongly 
influenced by the work of Husserl, and Reichenb~ch.' too, was a 
student of Husserl in the period 1914-15. _The thmkmg_ of other 
German philosophers in the area of the philos~phy of soence, for 
example that of Wilhelm Ostwald or o~ N atorp, Rickert and the lesser 
Neo-Kantians has, in contrast, been nghtly forgotten. 
9. A compl~te list of the publications of the circle is given in S~ulez, 
pp. 346f, which also contains other useful supplementary matenal on 
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the wider Austrian background of the Vienna positivists. 
10. ]. C. Nyiri has indeed argued that there is a conservative and 
tra~itionalist cl!rrent running through the whole of Austrian 
philosophy of saence. See his 1986. 
11. See Neurath, 1973; esp. chs.5, 8 and 11. 
1.2 .. on Schlick's political opinions see, again, the interview with 
Hemnch Neider: 
Schlick was a man who had no sympathy at all for politics and the 
state; he w~s a liberal in _the old sense, for whom the fire brigade 
and the pohce were admitted as at best a necessary evil. Otherwise 
one did not need the state at all. (Haller and Rutte, 1977, p. 24) 
13. See especially his just-mentioned essay of 1986, by which the 
present paper has been heavily influenced. 
14. Ny!ri, 1986, p. 143. . 
15. See. Haller, 19~6, and the references there given. 
. 16: ~eiler, 1986, 1s a strong statement of this thesis, and of its 
1mphcauons for a? .1-!nderstanding of the peculiarities of Austrian 
philosophy. For cntiasms of the thesis see Grassl and Smith, 1986. 
17. K. ~:Reinhold, on ~he other hand, was an Austrian renegade 
metaphysman who fled Vienna for Weimar. (What is said in the text 
should not, of cours~, be taken to imply that there is a complete 
absence of metaphysical system-building in Austria (or indeed in 
England and Scotland): system-builders of the worst and most 
unreadable kind have indeed come to dominate in the University of 
Vienna itself in recent decades.) 
18. See Grassl, 1986, for further references. , 
19. Neurath, 1973, p. 303. A comprehensive discussion of this 
aspect of the de~elopmertt of positivism in Austria is provided by 
Stadler, 1982, which deals also with the social and political attitudes of 
Mach. 
20. Menger's 'exact method' in economics in fact manifests a 
number of parallels to ~he method of Franz Brentano in philosophy, 
and ther~ were considerable reciprocal influences between the 
Menger arcle on the one hand and the Brentano school on the other. 
See the papers collected in Grassl and Smith (eds.), 1986. 
21. The vo.lu~e in q~es.tion is a collection of Mill's writings on 
female emanapat10n, socrahsm and Plato. It is worth mentioning here 
also th.at Brenta?o was no less .r~sponsi?I~ _tha? Mach ~or th~ strong 
reception of t~e 1d~as of the BntISh empmasts m Austria. Th1sis seen 
for e~ample m his ?wn w?rk on Reid, and on the psychology of 
Hamilton and the Mills, Bam and Spencer; and it is seen also in the 
work of Meinong on Hume or in the work of Husserl on Locke and 
Berkeley. 
22. T~e Philoso~hical Society published also Hi)fler's Prefaces and 
Introductions to Classical Works on Mechanics (189.9), as well as works of 
Bolzano (edited by Hofler in 1914 and by Hahn in 1921). 
23. See especially section 3 of Carnap, 1928. 
24. More than 100 pages of his On Knowledge (1925) are devoted to 
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a critique of Kant entitled 'Down With Prejudices! A Warning to the 
Present in the Spirit of Bacon and Descartes to Free Itself from All 
Blind A Priori'. 
25. Compare also Rutte, 1977, and Bergmann; 1967, esp. pp .. 4ff. 
26. Collected as Haller, 1979; see also his 1981 and the (in>many 
.respects definitive) essay of 1986. 
27. Further details of Brentano's life are given in ch. I of 
Rancurello, 1968. 
28. It is for this reason that it is preferable to speak not of 'Bren-
tanian philosophy' but of 'Brentano-inspired philosophy' or of the 
'descendants' and 'heirs' of Brentano. 
29. Twardowski's move to Lemlierg is significant: in Lemberg, 'as 
in Cracow, under liberal Austrian rule, Poles were allowed to go to 
their own universities and to be taught by their own lecturers and 
professors, while in other parts of partitioned Poland they were 
engaged in a most savage struggle for national and economic survival' 
(Jordan, 1945, p. 39: this passage not included in the reprint). On 
Twardowski's thought and influence,~especially in the field of logic, 
see Dambska, 1978. 
30. Fleck's relations to Polish Bre.ntanism have recently been made 
the object of a special study by Thomas Schnelle, 1982. 
31. Ajdukiewicz studied with Husserl in Gottingen from 1912 to 
1914. 
32. Carnap, 1963, p. 31. 
33. On the early history and philosophy of Gestalt psychology, see 
Smith (ed.), 1987. 
34. See Smith 1984 and also the papers collected in Mulligan (ed.), 
forthcoming. 
35. The two were colleagues in Berlin and retained their contacts 
when both had emigrated to America. See the chapter 'Albert 
Einstein and Max Wertheimer: A Gestalt Psychologist's View of the 
Genesis of the Special Relativity Theory' in Miller, 1984. All four of 
the Berlin Gestalt psychologists - Wertheimer, Kohler, Koffka and 
Lewin - had an interest in physics. 
36. Bergmann, 1929, p .. 395 of translation. 
37. See Ash, 1982, pp. 30-62 for an extensive treatment of this 
matter, and of the political machinations in favour of the new 'scien-
tific philosophy' which led to Stumpfs appointment in Berlin. 
38. See Schlick, 1925, pp. 23, 154, 157, 373 of the translation. 
39. See Musil, 1908; the work is highly critical of Mach in particular 
and of positivistic philosophy of science in general, so that it would be 
wrong to describe Musil himself as an advocate of positivist ideas: see 
Mulligan and Smith, 1987. 
40. Carnap, 1963, pp. 14, 30. . 
41. Thus Koffka could write at the close of his Principles of Gestalt 
Psychology: 
If there is any polemical spirit in this book, it is directed not against 
persons but against a strong cultural force .in our present civili-
sation for which I have chosen the name positivism. If positivism 
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can be regarded as an integrative philosophy, its integration rests 
on th~ dogma that all events are equally unintelligible, irrational, 
meamngl.ess'. pu~ely f~ctual". Such an integration is, however, to my 
way of thmkmg, 1dent1cal with a complete disintegration. (Koffka, 
1935,pp.684£) 
42. See Carnap, 1963, p. 16, and compare his 1928, pp. 109, 122 of 
the translation. · 
43. A similar thesis as to the compatibility of positivism and Gestalt 
theory was defended also by R. von Mises, 1939, ch.22. The Gestalt 
problem played ~ important role in the thinking of Gustav 
Bergmann, as also m the workofEino Kaila (see his 1979), a Finnish 
thinker who is one of the four foreign philosophers (neither Austrian 
nor German) mention,ed in the Appendix to the Wissenschaftliche 
Weltauffassung as 'sympathetic to the Vienna circle' or to the 'scientific 
world-conception'. · 
44. The remaining two papers - 'Logical Analysis of "Gestalt" as 
"Functional Whole"', and 'A Logical Theory of Dependence' were 
scheduled to appear in volume 9 of Erlunntnis in 1939 an issue not 
distr!buted due to war conditions. These two papers, tog°ether with an 
E.nglish translation of the earlier work and a commentary by P. M. 
Simons, have now been published in Smith (ed.), 1987. 
45. Grelling and Oppenheim, 1938, p. 211. · 
46. This point of view is belied, at least to some extent, by the fact 
that Carnap, having earlier studied under Frege in Jena, participated 
for a term in Husser_1's seminar in Freiburg, before going to Vienna in 
1925 at the suggestion of Schlick. He was later invited by Frank to 
come to Prague, where he held a chair in 'natural philosophy' for four 
years from 1931. 
47. See Ingarden, 1936. 
48. Liibbe, 1960, p. 91 of translation. The. affinities between 
Machian positivism and early phenomenology are illustrated clearly 
by the case of Alexander Pfander, senior member of the Munich 
school of phenomenologists, whose early thinking is heavily influ-
enced by that of Mach. 
49. Sommer, 1985, p. 13. . 
50. On Wittgens~~i~ and phenomenology in general, see Spiegel-
berg, 1968. On pos1t1V1sm, Husserl and the a frriori, see Delius, 1963, 
ch.I, and also Visser, 1979. Smith, 1986, contains a more detailed 
elaboration of the early Husserlian notion of the a frriori. . 
51. Such examples were drawn, too, from the domain of 
economics, as is s?own above all by the writings on economic 
methodology of Felix Kaufmann (for example his 1937). Kaufmann, 
a devo!ee o~ Husserl ~ho belonged to the fringes of both the Schlick 
and Mises circles, published not only on the foundations of economics 
and on the philosophy oflaw and mathematics, but also on the found-
. ations of science in general. 
52. See Brentano, 1869. Brentano's piece itself echoes J. S. Mill's 
Auguste Comte and Positivism of 1865, and Brentano laments at the 
beginning of the work the extent to which the new ideas. of positive 
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philosophy developed in France and England had remained almost 
unnoticed by his German contemporaries. ~ 
53. This is thesis IV. See Brentano, 1929, pp. 137ff. 
54. The caveat 'nisi intellectus ipse' wafadded by Leibniz. 
55. My present remarks are indebted to Chisholm's important 
study of Schlick and Brentano, published in 1982. c 
56. Schlick, 1934, trans. p. 385; quoted by Chisholm, 1982, p. 152. 
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3 
Ayer and the Philosophy of Science 
Mary Hesse 
Positivism and scientific meaning 
Positivism is a recurrent phenomenon in the history of science, 
but less so in the history of philosophy, where it quickly 
develops from the search for a firm grounding for knowledge 
to a scepticism about all knowledge, and thence to the revival of 
metaphysics in one form or another. This philosophical 
progression can be seen in the way logical positivism in the 
philosophy of science has developed in the last fifty years into a 
philosophical reaction back to all kinds of metaphysics: about 
realism, about natural kinds, about causes, about laws and 
necessity. 
During that time, Professor Ayer has been properly critical 
of the more extravagant metaphysical fashions. While 
modifying several of his radical theses in Language, Truth and 
Logic, he has remained reasonable, dear and full of good sense 
in his subsequent discussions of problems in philosophy of 
science. His problems have been technical philosopher's 
problems rather than those of science itself. In the last sentence 
of LTL he says that the philosopher 'must become a scientist' in 
'deploying the logical relationships of these hypotheses and 
defining the symbols which occur in them ... if he is to make 
any substantial contribution towards the growth ·Of human 
knowledge' .1 Later, however, he has come to treat 
philosophical problems as independent of those of the special 
sciences. 
In this paper I shall therefore talk as much aboutLTL and its 
structure and influence as about its author's later work in 
philosophy of science. But first let me say something about the 
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